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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GENE DECKER, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
NANNETTE ROLFE, 
Respondent-Appellee. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20070210-CA 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Deputy Marshall's statement that if he was Mr. Decker he would not take the 
chemical or breath test, operated to impermissibly influence Mr. Decker against taking 
the requested test. Mr. Decker's refusal was not voluntary and the resulting suspension 
of his license was erroneous. 
The District Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the Appellee's denial of 
his request for a hearing. Mr. Decker made a Request for Reconsideration when he 
requested the Driver License Division grant him a hearing which was subsequently 
denied. Moreover, a driver need not exhaust his administrative remedies as a pre-
requisite for seeking Judicial Review of a suspension order issued by the Driver License 
Division pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223. 
1 
ARGUMENT 
(The Single Point in the Opening Brief) 
L THE DEPUTY'S STATEMENT TO THE ARRESTEE THAT "IF IT 
WERE HIM HE WOULD NOT SUBMIT TO THE CHEMICAL TEST" 
RENDERS THE SUBSEQUENT REFUSAL AS INVOLUNTARY AND 
REQUIRES REINSTATEMENT OF THE DRIVER'S LICENSE. 
The Appellee State of Utah claims Mr. Decker's sole argument on appeal is that 
Deputy Marshall's statement, "I, personally, would not submit to a chemical test/' 
rendered Mr. Decker incapable of refusing because of his reliance on the Deputy's 
statement. Brief of Appellee at 15. The Appellee both misstates and overstates Mr. 
Decker's position. 
As clearly articulated in the opening brief, Mr. Decker insists that his refusal to 
take a chemical test should be invalidated because the officer's expression of what he, 
himself, would do when asked to take such a test rendered the deputy's later request and 
warning to be without meaning and efficacy. Brief of Appellant at 8. Mr. Decker also 
stated in his opening brief that "[t]he analysis provided by Mr. Decker presents an issue 
of first impression in Utah yet receives support from those cases which analyze the 
critical evidence of voluntariness in other situations." Brief of Appellant at 8. Therefore, 
to no surprise, and as noted by the State, the cases cited by Mr. Decker are factually 
distinguishable from his case. Cases of first impression are named such because no other 
cases have decided the issue and addressed these same circumstances. That posture, 
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however, does not leave Mr. Decker without authority to support invalidating his refusal 
and reinstating his license. 
Mr. Decker's arresting law enforcement officer during an hour transport to the 
sheriffs office engaged in several conversations with Mr. Decker while he was seated 
next to him, in the front seat of the patrol car. R. 78 at 13-15,55,61. The officer 
conceded that he spoke very honestly with Mr. Decker about all aspects of the situation. 
Id. at 15. Among the honest revelations made to the arrested person Mr. Decker was the 
Deputy's personal opinion that if he was Mr. Decker he would not submit to a chemical 
test; the deputy unquestionably knew that Mr. Decker was soliciting information about 
what to do and would use the deputy's opinion in making up his mind. R. 78 at 13-14. 
To that point in the case the deputy had not formally requested that Mr. Decker 
submit to a chemical test. Not surprisingly, when the deputy did request Mr. Decker to 
submit to the test, Mr. Decker refused. He later indicated that refusal was based 100% on 
the deputy's opinion that the deputy would not take the test if he, the officer, was in the 
same situation as Mr. Decker. R. 78 at 14-15; 69-70. Any following admonitions by the 
deputy about the consequences of that decision were undermined, discounted and 
rendered ineffectual by Mr. Decker given his reliance on the deputy's experience and 
knowledge of the circumstances, the law and the legal process. 
While the State refers to this dialog between the two as Mr. Decker's "verbal 
games," a review of the testimony about the discussions between the two reveals no 
games, but rather a genuine desire to have the officer provide guidance to Mr. Decker. 
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Even the deputy saw the questions as intending to illicit advice from him and initially 
refused to give it; then despite that recognition, he gave an answer to Mr. Decker couched 
as his personal opinion of what he would do in the situation. The case law cited by Mr. 
Decker highlights a variety of considerations which urge the court to disavow his refusal, 
construe the expressed personal opinion of the deputy as improper and violative of the 
standards of establishing a knowing waiver of one's rights and grant Mr. Decker the 
relief of reinstating his license. 
Mr. Decker will not duplicate those arguments here as they are detailed in the 
opening brief beginning at page 5. However, he reiterates in substance that in addressing 
this novel question, support may be gleaned from statutes and cases which detail that an 
officer is responsible in the given situation to provide warnings which are meaningful and 
specific to the situation so as to permit a finding that any refusal is volitional. 
And while Mr. Decker never has argued that he was dazed or injured, he was 
expressly informed by the officer that he wouldn't himself take the test. The deputy's 
admonitions subsequent to that expression were meaningless and in conflict with the 
deputy's duty and obligation. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-520 (2006)(an arresting officer 
has the duty to properly advise a driver); State v. Beck, 597 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1979)( it is 
important that a law enforcement officer make a determination that a motorist has refused 
to take a test on the basis of conduct which clearly indicates a volitional refusal); Mills v. 
Swanson, 460 P.2d 704 (Idaho 1969)(what constitutes a refusal to take the test must 
depend on the circumstances of the case). 
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Here is where the Fifth Amendment and Miranda cases help analytically. In 
State v. Hample, 706 P.2d 1173 (Alaska 1985), and State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 
(Utah App. 1990), the courts found officers who responded to a suspect's questions in 
ways which either demeaned the rights being explained or minimized their import given 
the officer's own opinions to the contrary, resulted in findings that invalidated the 
waivers obtained as involuntary. In essence, the deputy's opinion (aware that the 
opinion was to be considered as advice) that he would not take the test affected Mr. 
I i 
• i . 
Decker's refusal in this case rendering it involuntary just as the Hampel officer's 
explanation of the obstacles surrounding getting a lawyer rendered his choice to waive 
counsel as involuntary and just as the Sampson officer encouraging that suspect "to just 
get it over with" rather than to get him a lawyer or clarify the request assisted in 
rendering that waiver involuntary. 
Similarly, the deputy's later reading (or re-reading) of the admonition and/or new 
waiver of rights to Mr. Decker are consistent with the officers' actions in Sampson and 
Hampel. After having demeaned the choice or discounted its importance, the Sampson 
and Hampel officers failed to cure their previously inappropriate responses to questions 
from suspects intent on receiving direction and assistance as did Mr. Decker's officer 
here. See Opening Brief at pp. 9-12. Mr. Decker was unquestionably influenced 
significantly by the deputy's personal opinion that he would not take the chemical test in 
this case. That opinion expressed by the officer was inappropriate and rendered the 
choice to be made by Mr. Decker as improperly influenced and involuntary. 
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Because the deputy inappropriately influenced Mr. Decker's decision, failing in 
his obligation opting instead to tell him what he would do in the situation, this Court 
should find Mr. Decker's refusal to be improperly given and involuntary. The resulting 
suspension of his license is a direct consequence of the advice provided by the deputy 
and should be vacated. 
(New Point Raised by Appellee as its First Point) 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO HEAR 
PETITIONERS APPEAL FROM THE DENIAL OF HIS 
REQUEST FOR AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING. 
The State claims that Mr. Decker failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and 
that the district court was without jurisdiction to hear the case. Brief of Appellee, at Point 
I, pages 7-14. The Appellee State of Utah previously raised this same issue before this 
Court as a Motion for Summary Disposition. This Court denied that request on May 11, 
2007, entering an Order noting that the Court had previously rejected such an argument 
in Morgan v. Blackstock, 1999 Utah App 162. See Addendum A for copy of the Order; 
see Addendum B for copy of Morgan v. Blackstock. The Court indicated that summary 
disposition was inappropriate but gave leave for the Appellee to raise the issue for full 
consideration if it chose to do so. 
Mr. Decker insists the Appellee's argument is without merit for two reasons: first; 
Mr. Decker did make a request for reconsideration of the suspension of his driver license 
before the Division; and second, state law does not require a driver to exhaust 
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administrative remedies prior to filing an appeal of the Division's decision to suspend or 
i 
revoke a license in district court. 
Taking the second reason first, a driver whose driver license has been suspended 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223 need not exhaust his administrative remedies 
before seeking judicial review of his suspension. This issue, as this Court noted in 
denying the Motion for Summary Disposition, has already been addressed and decisively 
decided by this Court in the case of Morgan v. Blackstock. 
In Morgan, this Court ruled that: 
Although Utah Code Ann. § 53-3- 223(6) (1998) requires the Division to grant a 
hearing if requested in writing within ten days of arrest, no statute requires a 
hearing to be held as a prerequisite to judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §53-3-
223 (8)(B)( 1998) states that "[a] person whose license has been suspended by the 
division under this subsection may file a petition within 30 days after the 
suspension for a hearing on the matter which, if held, is governed by Section 53-
3-224." Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-224 (1998) states, in part, that a person whose 
license "has been canceled, suspended, or revoked by the division may seek 
judicial review of the division's order." In fact, the Division's order suspending 
Morgan's license advised him that he could seek judicial review in district court. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2)(1997), a petitioner need not exhaust all 
administrative remedies when "this chapter or any other statute states that 
exhaustion is not required." j 
Morgan v. Blackstock, 1999 UT App. 162 (emphasis in original). Notably, the Morgan 
Court decision, as noted in the above quote, reviewed statutory language to reach its 
decision. The plain language of the statutes dictates the decision and negates the need for 
any reconsideration as urged by Appellee. 
Returning to the first reason for rejecting the Appellee's argument, the Division 
provided Mr. Decker notice that his license was suspended in a letter dated June 14, 
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2006. In that letter the Division informed Mr. Decker he could request a reconsideration 
of the suspension and if that reconsideration were to be denied he could appeal to the 
district court for review. See Addendum C. Importantly, the Petitioner Mr. Decker in 
this case had already filed an appropriate request for consideration of the Division's 
action when he filed a pro se, hand written letter dated June 5, 2006, requesting that he be 
granted a hearing despite the fact that he had not made his request within ten days. See 
Addendum D. 
The Division denied his request for reconsideration in the Division's letter sent to 
Mr. Decker, dated June 8, 2006, specifically recognizing his hand written letter stating, 
"You may appeal this action in the district court in the county in which the offense 
occurred within thirty (30) days of the effective date of your suspension." See 
Addendum E. By the inclusion of this language in its letter the Division Appellee is 
effectively estopped in this case against Mr. Decker from arguing the district court was 
without jurisdiction to hear his appeal. Accordingly, Mr. Decker did attempt to invoke 
his administrative remedies and was denied by the Driver License Division. 
Despite Mr. Decker's failure to submit a written request for a hearing within 10 
days of the date of his arrest, Mr. Decker filed a timely request for reconsideration which 
was subsequently denied and he followed that action with a timely Petition for Judicial 
Review recognized as appropriate by the Division. This case is not the case to review 
whether Morgan and the plain language of the appropriate sections of the Utah Code need 
to be reconsidered. This Court should affirm its earlier decision on the denial of the 
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summary disposition and deny the State's request to find that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Decker's driver's license was suspended for refusing to take a chemical test as 
requested by the deputy who had previously informed him that the Deputy himself would 
not take the test if he were Mr. Decker. The Deputy's action rendered Mr. Decker's 
refusal as involuntary and the resulting suspension of his license as erroneous. 
Mr. Decker's appeal to the district court was appropriately filed, as is his appeal to 
• ' • • I • 
this Court, inasmuch as his hand written letter was accepted and considered as a request 
for reconsideration by the Division itself which indicated his action was appropriate to 
the district court. Further, current controlling authority at the time of his filing into 
district court neither required the Division's permission nor exhausting its remedies. 
Therefore, for all or any of the foregoing reasons Mr. Decker respectfully requests 
that the Order of the District Court denying his Petition for Judicial Review and 
upholding the suspension order issued by the Driver License Division be overturned and 
that his driver license be reinstated immediately. 
DATED this£/_ day of September, 2007. 
)N SCHATZ 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Jason Schatz, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered the original 
and seven copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
450 South State, 5th Floor, P. O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and two 
copies to be mailed, postage prepaid to Nancy L. Kemp, Assistant Attorney General, 160 
East 300 South, Fifth Floor, P.O. Box 140858, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114-0858, this 
(trtey of September, 2007. 
JON SCHAT: 
Attorney for Appellant 
I mailed copies to the Utah Court of Appeals and to Assistant Attorney General 
Nancy L. Kemp as indicated above this day of September, 2007. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAY 112007 
ooOoo 
Gene Decker, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Nanette Rolfe, Bureau Chief 
Driver Control Bureau, Driver 
License Division, Department 
of Public Safety, State of 
Utah, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
ORDER 
Case No. 20070210-CA 
This matter is before the court on Appellee's motion for 
summary disposition. Appellant has filed a response to the 
motion. Appellee argues that this court does not have subject 
matter jurisdiction over this appeal because Appellant did not 
exhaust his administrative remedies. This court has previously 
rejected such an argument in Morgan v. Blackstock, 1999 UT App 
162 (per curiam). Accordingly, summary disposition is not 
appropriate. With the being said, Appellee is entitled to 
present the issue, if it so chooses, for full consideration by 
the court in its brief. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellee *s motion for summary 
disposition is denied, and a ruling on the issues raised therein 
is deferred pending plenary presentation and consideration of the 
appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 10(f). The appeal shall proceed to 
the next procedural stage. 
DATED this T
4
^ 
1/ day of May, 2007 
FOR THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on May 11, 2 007, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or 
placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered to: 
JASON SCHATZ 
SCHATZ & ANDERSON 
356 E 900 S 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
NANCY L KEMP 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 5TH FL 
PO BOX 14 0858 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0858 
Dated this May 11, 2007. 
B y ^ 7<WULS~AJLL^C^M-*J> 
Deputy Clerk 
Case No. 20070210 
District Court No. 060911537 
ADDENDUM B 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Stephen Lynn MORGAN, Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
G. Barton BLACKSTOCK, Bureau Chief, Driver License Division, Respondent and 
Appellee. 
No. 9813400-CA. 
May 13, 1999. 
D. Bruce Oliver, Salt Lake City, for appellant. 
Jan Graham and James H. Beadles, Salt Lake City, for appellee. 
Before WILKINS, BENCH, and ORME, JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
PER CURIAM. 
*7 Appellant Stephen Lynn Morgan appeals from a district court judgment following a 
trial de novo, which affirmed a suspension of his driver's license by the Driver License 
Division. 
We first consider the Division's claim this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction based on 
Morgan's failure to request a presuspension hearing before the Division prior to seeking 
judicial review. The district court denied a motion to dismiss on this basis. Although Utah 
Code Ann. § 53-3-223(6) (1998) requires the Division to grant a hearing if one is 
requested in writing within ten days of arrest, no statute requires a hearing to be held as a 
prerequisite to judicial review. Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223(8)(B)(1998) states "[a] 
person whose license has been suspended by the division under this subsection may file a 
petition within 30 days after the suspension for a hearing on the matter which, if held, is 
governed by Section 53-3-224." Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-224 (1998) states, in part, that a 
person whose license has "been canceled, suspended, or revoked by the division may 
seek judicial review of the division's order." In fact, the Division's order suspending 
Morgan's license advised him that he could seek judicial review in district court. Under 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2)(1997), a petitioner need not exhaust all administrative 
remedies when "this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not required." 
The trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss based upon its construction of 
the statutes governing judicial review. 
The Division also seeks dismissal of the appeal as moot because the suspension has 
expired and the requested relief could not be obtained on appeal. However, Morgan's 
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request in district court sought reversal of the suspension or5 if it had expired, 
expungement of Morgan's driving record. Based upon the latter request, the appeal is not 
moot. 
Morgan argues the trial court's refusal to hear defense counsel's closing arguments denied 
him due process by preventing him from raising all of the defenses available to him. 
Morgan's contention the Division did not present any evidence that he received timely 
notice of the Division's intent to suspend his license is without merit. The DUI Summons 
and Citation contained notice of the intent to suspend his license and a certification by the 
arresting officer that "a copy of the summons and citation was duly served upon the 
defendant according to law on the above date," referring to the July 25, 1997 date of 
arrest. In addition, the officer testified at the trial de novo that he filled out the DUI 
citation and he issued it to Morgan "directly after [he] performed the intoxilizer test and 
completed the form." Evidence supporting timely notice was entered in the record 
without objection, and Morgan presented no conflicting evidence. Morgan asserted his 
other procedural argument at trial, which resulted in a ruling that service of the DUI 
summons and citation on the Division was timely. He has not attempted to demonstrate 
on appeal that this finding was erroneous. Because the argument that the Division did not 
demonstrate compliance with the statutory notice requirements is without merit, Morgan 
was not prejudiced by not being allowed to present closing argument on these claimed 
defenses. 
*2 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment following the trial de novo. 
Utah App., 1999. 
Morgan v. Blackstock 
Not Reported in P.3d, 1999 WL 33244737 (Utah App.), 1999 UT App 162 
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ADDENDUM C 
Jon M. Huntsman, Jr. 
Governor 
Robert L. Flowers 
Commissioner 
State uf Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION 
Nannette Rolfe 
Director 
P.O. Box 30560 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0560 
(801)965-4437 
Date of Arrest: 21 May 2006 
Date of Birth: 10 Dec 1962 
License/File Number: 14676805 
Date: 14 Jun 2006 
This Order is Effective 
12:01 AM on 20 Jun 2006 
GENE DALE DECKER 
8630 W ENQUINOX CIR 
COPPERTON UT 84006 
As a result of refusal to submit to a chemical test on a second or subsequent alcohol arrest while driving a 
motor vehicle, a motorboat or an off-highway vehicle, your driving privilege is revoked for a period of twenty-
four (24) months effective 20 Jun 2006. The basis for this action is the hearing officer's findings of fact and 
conclusion that you refused to submit to a chemical test after being requested and warned by.a peace officer, 
or you failed to request a hearing, or you failed to appear for the.hearing, contrary to Utah Code Annotated 
41-6-44.10, renumbered to 41-6a-521, or the implied consent law of another state. 
This action is in accordance with Titles 41 and 53 Utah Code Annotated, 1953. This notice does not replace 
any prior notice already in effect. 
***IMPORTANT INFORMATION - PLEASE READ*** 
When your driving privilege has been revoked for an alcohol violation you must discontinue driving all 
motor vehicles. It is a misdemeanor to operate any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state until the 
sanction period is over and you have reinstated and obtained a valid driving privilege. Effective 
immediately, driving with a measurable or detectable amount of alcohol in the body is a violation of UCA 
41-6a-530 and may result in an additional 1-year period of revocation. 
In compliance with UCA 63-46b-13, a written request for reconsideration of the evidence presented at the 
administrative hearing may be filed with the Driver License Division, within twenty (20) days of the effective 
date of this notice. If the division denies the request, the petitioner may appeal to the District Court, in the 
county of the incident, in compliance with UCA 53-3-224. 
WHEN YOU ARE ELIGIBLE TO REINSTATE YOUR DRIVING PRIVILEGE, 
YOU MUST COMPLY WITH THE FOLLOWING: 
• Pay a $50.00 reinstatement fee. Pay an administrative fee of $150.00. Other fees may apply. 
• Make check or money order payable to: Utah Department of Public Safety. 
• Please indicate your license or file number on the check or money order and mail to the above 
address. 
• Based on this refusal, you will have an alcohol restriction placed on your driving privilege for a period 
often (10) years from the beginning date of the revocation. When an alcohol restriction has been 
placed on your driving privilege, you must not drive if you have any alcohol in your system. 
• Pursuant to 41-6a-518.2, if your arrest date was on or after May 1, 2006, you are required to have an 
Ignition Interlock Device installed in any vehicle that you operate for a period of 3 years from the 
effective date of this notice. Operating a vehicle without an Ignition Interlock Device when you are 
an "Interlock Restricted Driver" is a violation of 41-6a-518.2 and may result in vehicle impoundment 
and additional Ignition Interlock Device restriction time. 
• Apply for a new driver license or driving privilege card by taking the required tests and paying the 
fee. 
Respectfully, 
Nannette Rolfe, Dikrotor 
Driver License Division 
CC: 
ADDENDUM D 
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ADDENDUM E 
Jon M. Huntsman Jr 
Governor 
Robert L. Flowers 
Commissioner 
StaJ) of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION 06-08-06 
Nannette Rolfe 
Director 
P.O. Box 30560 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0560 
(801)965-4437 
GENE D DECKER 
8630 W EQUINOX CIR 
COPPERTON UT 84006 
File: 14676805 
Arrest Date: 05-21-06 
DOB: 12-10-62 
Dear Driver: 
Recently, you were arrested for Driving Under the Influence and were served with a 
notice of this Department's intention to deny, suspend, revoke or disqualify your Utah driving 
privilege as a result. In that notice you were informed that you have the right to request in 
writing a hearing on this intended suspension. The notice specified that your WRITTEN 
REQUEST must be sent to the Department WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS of the date of arrest. 
(Utah Code Annotated 41 and 53.) 
"Request Date: 06-05-06 Fax Date: 06-05-06" 
The Department has received your written request for a hearing in this matter. 
However, the evidence on your letter indicates that the request was not submitted within the 
statutorily mandated 10-day period. Therefore, the Department must deny your request for an 
administrative hearing on this matter. The suspension of your Utah driving privilege will 
automatically take place on the 30th day after the date of your arrest. 
You may appeal this action in the district court in the county in which the offense 
occurred within thirty (30) days of the effective date of your suspension. 
Respectfully, 
Nannette Rolfe, Director 
Driver License Division 
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